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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
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_____________ 
 
GERSHWAIN SPRAUVE, 
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 v. 
 
 THE WEST INDIAN COMPANY LIMITED; JOSEPH BOSCHULTE, in his Personal 
Capacity and as President and Chief Executive Officer of the West Indian Company 
Limited; BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE WEST INDIAN COMPANY LIMITED 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2777 
_____________ 
 
ANDREA V. SMITH, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 THE WEST INDIAN COMPANY LIMITED; JOSEPH BOSCHULTE, in his Personal 
Capacity and as President and Chief Executive Officer of the West Indian Company 
Limited; BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE WEST INDIAN COMPANY LIMITED 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
of the Virgin Islands 
(Nos. 3:13-cv-00008 & No. 3:13-cv-00030) 
District Judge:  Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
______________ 
 
Argued:  December 13, 2018 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 17, 2019) 
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St. Thomas, VI 00801 
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5194 Dronningens Gade, Suite 3 
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
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__________________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.  
Gershwain Sprauve and Andrea Smith appeal the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of West Indian Company Limited (“WICO”) and Joseph 
Boschulte.  Sprauve and Smith argue that the District Court erred in concluding that they 
failed to establish a procedural due process claim.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.  
I. 
WICO was founded in 1912, starting as a coal bunkering business and eventually 
developing into the “Port Agent” of the port of Charlotte Amalie in St. Thomas.  Sprauve 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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v. W. Indian Co., 799 F.3d 226, 227 (3d Cir. 2015).  In 1993, it was purchased by the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, becoming “a public corporation and governmental 
instrumentality.”  Id. 
Gershwain Sprauve began working at WICO in 1997 as Manager of Mall 
Operations.  In 2010 and again in 2011, he applied to become WICO’s President and 
CEO.  WICO’s Board, however, awarded the position to Joseph Boschulte, and the 
relationship between Sprauve and Boschulte quickly soured.  Boschulte accused Sprauve 
of insubordination, prompting Sprauve to complain about him to the Board.  Ultimately, 
in August 2012, Boschulte fired Sprauve for failing to attend a legislative hearing –– a 
hearing Sprauve claims he was neither directed nor asked to attend.   
Andrea Smith began working at WICO in 1981 as a bookkeeper.  Over time, she 
worked her way up the ladder, eventually becoming WICO’s Chief Financial Officer.  
She also served as WICO’s Acting President and CEO for nearly a year until Boschulte 
was hired.  Smith alleges that Boschulte became upset with her after she denied his 
request for reimbursement of certain expenses.  According to Smith, Boschulte was not 
entitled to reimbursement because he was not a WICO employee.  Smith alleges that 
Boschulte became angry with her again when he discovered that the Board had 
interviewed her while investigating Sprauve’s complaint.  In January 2013, Boschulte 
fired Smith for “failure to execute.”  Joint Appendix (“JA”) 750.  
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Sprauve and Smith each sued Boschulte and WICO, alleging a host of claims 
under both federal and Virgin Islands law.1  Most relevant to this appeal, they both 
alleged that their terminations violated their respective Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
due process.  The District Court granted summary judgment in both cases in favor of the 
defendants on all the federal claims.2  Regarding Sprauve’s and Smith’s due process 
claims in particular, the District Court found that they had “no property right in [their] 
continued employment and, consequently, no claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
JA 75; see also JA 36.   
Sprauve and Smith timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and 
we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of 
summary judgment is de novo.  Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 
2014).  Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-movant, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).   
                                              
1 The District Court initially dismissed the suits, holding that the federal claims, 
premised on constitutional violations, failed because WICO and Boschulte were not state 
actors.  Sprauve, 799 F.3d at 228–29.  But we reversed, holding that “WICO must be 
considered a government entity for the purposes of Sprauve’s and Smith’s constitutional 
claims.”  Id. at 227. 
2 In both cases, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the claims arising under Virgin Islands law.   
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III. 
To establish a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
plaintiff must show a deprivation of a constitutionally protected “property” interest.  Iles 
v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011).  Public employees who can be fired only 
“for cause” have such a protected property interest in their continued employment.  
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997).  Sprauve and Smith argue that they had 
such protection because they were “regular employees,” a category of public employees 
in the Virgin Islands who cannot be fired without cause.  See V.I. Code tit. 3, 
§ 530(a)(2)(C)(ii).3   
Sprauve’s and Smith’s argument assumes that WICO employees, like themselves, 
are public employees within the executive branch of the Virgin Islands Government.  But 
we do not decide that issue here because, regardless, Sprauve and Smith have produced 
no evidence that they were “regular employees” under § 530.   
A “regular employee” is one who has either “been appointed to a position in the 
classified or career service or served in a temporary position for more than two years in a 
department or agency of the executive branch or in an instrumentality.”  V.I. Code tit. 3, 
§ 530(a)(2)(C)(i).  Sprauve and Smith have not proven either.  First, they have not 
                                              
3 WICO and Boschulte contend that we should not consider this argument because 
Sprauve and Smith failed to raise it below.  It is true, generally, “that a federal appellate 
court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 120 (1976).  Here, though Sprauve and Smith did not raise their “regular 
employees” argument below, the District Court still discussed it.  Because the argument 
was thus “passed upon below,” id. at 120, we will consider it.    
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demonstrated that they were “appointed to a position in the classified or career service.” 
Id. (emphasis added).  Under Title 3, Chapter 25 of the Virgin Islands Code, appointment 
is a particular process.  A “department head” looking to fill a position must “submit to the 
Director of Personnel a statement showing the position to be filled and the duties of the 
position.”  Id. § 526(a).  The Director of Personnel then certifies a list of “no fewer than 
three eligibles for such position,” from which the “appointing authority, after consultation 
with the department head[,] shall appoint one of those whose names are certified.”  Id. 
There is no evidence in the record that Sprauve or Smith obtained their jobs in this 
manner.4 
Second, Sprauve and Smith have not shown that they “served in a temporary 
position for more than two years in a department or agency of the executive branch or in 
an instrumentality.”  Id. § 530(a)(2)(C)(i).  Even if we assume, without deciding, that 
WICO counts as “a department or agency of the executive branch” or an 
“instrumentality,” Sprauve and Smith have neither argued nor shown that any of the 
positions they held over their many years of service were temporary.  Perhaps the only 
role that either of them occupied that could be construed as “temporary” was Smith’s 
position as Interim President and CEO –– and Smith had that role for less than a year.  
                                              
4 Sprauve and Smith insist that they were appointed to their positions because 
WICO had competitive hiring procedures.  But WICO’s use of a competitive hiring 
process does not mean that its employees were “appointed.”  As explained above, 
appointment involves filling a position based on a certified list provided by the Director 
of Personnel.  See V.I. Code tit. 3, § 526.  Exceptions to the appointments process exist, 
but Sprauve and Smith do not claim any apply here.  See, e.g., id. § 529 (emergency 
appointments).   
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Accordingly, Sprauve and Smith have not established that they are entitled to for-
cause protection.  As they do not offer any other basis for reversal, we hold that the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment on their due process claims.5  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment.    
                                              
5 Our decision in Sprauve is not to the contrary.  We held there “that WICO must 
be considered a government entity for the purposes of Sprauve’s and Smith’s 
constitutional claims.”  799 F.3d at 227.  That does not mean that WICO’s employees are 
“regular employees” under § 530.  Indeed, we emphasized that we were “only examining 
whether WICO is a government entity for the purpose of determining whether 
constitutional claims can be lodged directly against it.”  Id. at 230 n.3. 
